The Biometric Cut
Police retain uncharged individuals' biometric data indefinitely. Decisions made behind closed doors.
Dispatch #28 — The Biometric Cut
The UK government keeps your DNA profile and fingerprints on a national database even when you are never charged with a crime. You don't need to be convicted. You don't need to be charged. You just need to be arrested — and then the police can ask the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner to keep your biometric data indefinitely.[1]
Here's how it works. When someone is arrested, police take fingerprints and a DNA sample. The sample is destroyed after a profile is created. But the profile — your unique genetic identify — gets loaded onto the national database.[1] Normally, if you're not charged, that data should be deleted. Unless the police decide otherwise. They submit an application to the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, explaining why your biometric data should be retained. The Commissioner reviews it. You — the person whose data is at stake — are notified and can submit responses.[2] Then the Commissioner decides. No court. No judge. No jury. Just an independent officeholder reviewing a police force's paperwork.[3]
This power comes from section 63G of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, inserted by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.[3] The legislation was sold as a reform — a way to prevent the indiscriminate retention of innocent people's biometric data. The narrative was clear: arrested does not mean guilty; biometric data belongs to the individual, not the state. What wasn't explained was the exception. Police can still apply to keep your data. And the Commissioner can say yes.
What happens next is not public. The Commissioner publishes guidance on the principles used to assess these applications — factors like the seriousness of the alleged offence, the strength of evidence, the risk of reoffending, and any relevant previous history.[3] But the actual decisions? How many applications were made last year. How many were granted. The demographic breakdown of who is most affected. That data is not published as a matter of routine.
This is the cut. Not the dramatic invasion — the quiet admin channel. A process designed to sound like accountability but operating in shadow. Police apply. Commissioner decides. You are told — after the fact, in writing, with a deadline. And if the Commissioner says yes, your genetic blueprint sits on a database linked to law enforcement systems across the country. No conviction required. No ongoing review mandated. Just a bureaucratic gate that opens one way.
Question: When the government retains the DNA profiles of uncharged individuals through an administrative process with no published outcomes — how does anyone verify whether the system is working as intended or becoming a de facto permanent database of the innocent?
[1] Applications for biometric retention: what you should know (accessible version). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/applications-for-biometric-retention-what-you-should-know/applications-for-biometric-retention-what-you-should-know-accessible-version
[2] Applications for Biometric Retention: What You Should Know (PDF). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/66c860296553ea61ea4f4362/Applications+for+Biometric+Retention+What+You+Should+Know+-+August+2024__1_.pdf
[3] Principles for assessing applications for biometric retention (accessible). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/principles-for-assessing-applications-for-biometric-retention/principles-for-assessing-applications-for-biometric-retention-accessible
Morgan Hale is independent verification without the editorial filter. Every cut is evidenced. Every question is open. Because it matters.